

## Security Programmable Metamaterial Antenna Array for Physical Layer Security **Open House**

**Prachi Patel and Dylan Turner** 

### Introductions:



#### **Dylan Turner**



**Prachi Patel** 

### **Motivation**


- Increasing need to develop low cost security protocol.
- Any reduction in cost affects tens of billions of devices.
- Investigate a computationally simpler security solution.



**The Internet of Things (IOT)** Collective Network of Billions of Devices




## Solution



Security Programmable Metamaterial Antenna Array for Physical Layer Security Physical Layer Security

• Exploiting **physical properties** of a system to provide security against eavesdropper.



- This project focuses on
   Directional Modulation
- How do we achieve this?

### Security Programmable Metamaterial Antenna Array for Physical Layer Security Metamaterial Antenna Array (MTM)


- A material which exhibits properties that are **not found in nature**.
  - Eg: Applies a variable <u>phase shift</u> to a signal dependent on voltage.



Applied voltage: small shift

No voltage: large shift

Several <u>Metamaterial Antennas</u> can be put together to form an array.




### Security Programmable Metamaterial Antenna Array for Physical Layer Security Security Programmable

- **Programmable via codes** which are applied to the Metamaterial array.
- Phase shifts from the elements will cause the signal to scramble itself in undesired directions.

Injected signal passes through each <u>Metamaterial Element</u>





Red = Voltage on | Blue = Voltage off

### Security Programmable

### Metamaterial Antenna Array


### for Physical Layer Security



## **The Problem**


### Problem with Sending More Data

#### Faster Data Rate $\rightarrow$ Wider bandwidth



Signal must be spread across wider band of frequencies


#### **Problem: Antenna is Frequency Dependent**



"Parts of the signal" with large differences in frequency will be affected differently.


#### Symbol Precoding

#### Solution: Multiply the information by a "Precoding Vector" that negates the effects of the antenna.



### **GNU** Radio

#### Open Source free toolkit for creating signal processing systems through software.



GNU Radio Implementation of our Transmitter



def	<pre>calc_w(self, nu, L, codes, alpha, period, b, psi, c): #Loop over L total_M = 0 for u in range(1, codes.shape[0] + 1):     total_M += self.calc_m(codes[u-1], alpha, period, b, psi, c) * np.exp(-1j return total_M * (np.sinc(nu / L) / L) * np.exp(1j * nu * np.pi / L)</pre>	
def	<pre>calc_m(self, code_u, alpha, period, b, psi, c): #Loop over N psi = 180 - psi total_gamma = 0 for n in range(1, code_u.shape[0]+1):         total_gamma += self.calc_gamma(n, b, code_u) * (np.exp(-alpha * (n-1) * pe return total_gamma</pre>	
def	<pre>calc_gamma(self, n, b, code_u): #Beta Values for bth carrier beta_0 = (1.488e-7 * (b * self.subcarrier_spacing + self.base_freq) - 338.46) beta 1 = (1.164e-7 * (b * self.subcarrier spacing + self.base freg) - 216.63)</pre>	

Snippet of Symbol Precoding Python Code




# Testing

### **Testing Phases**

#### 1. Simulation

#### 2. Basic Equipment


#### 3. MTM Antenna Array



Goal: ensure systems works at each stage before introducing more unknown variables.


### **Basic Equipment Testing**

#### **Wired Connection**



## **Goal:** Transmit and receive a wideband signal using the B205 Mini-i USRP


#### <u>Antenna</u>



These USRPs will be needed later to connect to our Antenna Prototype

### **Anechoic Chamber**

Allows for measurement of a systems performance without external interference or reflections



### Results

#### **Scrambled Signal**

header\_payload\_demux :info: Parser returned #f packet\_headerparser\_b :info: Detected an invalid packet at item 7872 header\_payload\_demux :info: Parser returned #f packet\_headerparser\_b :info: Detected an invalid packet at item 7920 header\_payload\_demux :info: Parser returned #f packet\_headerparser\_b :info: Detected an invalid packet at item 7968 header\_payload\_demux :info: Parser returned #f packet\_headerparser\_b :info: Detected an invalid packet at item 8066 header\_payload\_demux :info: Parser returned #f packet\_headerparser\_b :info: Detected an invalid packet at item 8016 header\_payload\_demux :info: Detected an invalid packet at item 8064 header\_payload\_demux :info: Parser returned #f

#### **Successful Transmission**

#### fag Debug: Payload nput Stream: 00

75°

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: rtame\_len
 Yalue: 34

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: 1157

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: 1587

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: 1587

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: 1587

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: 1587

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: 1587

 Offset O Source: r/la
 Key: racket, num
 Yalue: #[(0,-0) (0,-0)



## Symbol Precoding works as a proof of concept!

### Future Work

#### Short Term

- Automate measurements with Python scripts.
  - Manually testing is imprecise and slow.
- **Determine power restrictions** to protect hardware.
  - To be safe, we had to be lenient before.



#### Long Term

- **Refine system** to ensure consistent reception of ALL packets.
- Incorporate additional layer of security:
  - Account for distance, not just angle.



